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IS S'l'RBET-llAWIUBG BY PROSTITUTES WITHIN DIE LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION 
OF A PROVINCE AND A MUNICIPAL COUNCIL? 
Regina v. Westendorp Alberta Court of Appeal, February 1982 
On page 13 of Volume No. 5 of this publication we gave a synopsis of this 
case in the Alberta Provincial Court. The Assistant Chief Judge of that 
Court held that Ms. Westendorp would have been convicted of contravening a 
Calgary City by-law had that by-law been within the legislative jurisdic-
tion of that city's council. Ms. Westendorp had approached a plain clothed 
police officer and offered him her company and all its privileges for a 
price. 
The Provincial Court Judge had held that prohibiting such behaviour 
required criminal law sanctions within the purview of the Federal Govern-
ment. 
The Crown appealed Ms. Westendorp' s acquittal to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal. Although this case may later be considered by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Alberta judicial views are particularly of interest to us as 
the City of Vancouver has embarked on an approach not unlike Calgary to 
curb the prostitute nuisance on the city streets. 
At the courtesy of Mr. R. Vogel, B.C.'s Deputy Attorney General, we 
received a copy of the reasons for judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal 
and here is its "pith and substance". 
The Municipal Government Act of Alberta authorizes incorporated municipali-
ties to make by-laws to prevent disorderly conduct in public places, 
including drunkenness, offensive language, fighting, etc. Considering this 
to be the enabling legislation, the Calgary council added to its "street 
by-law" a prohibition for anyone to remain on a street for the purpose of 
prostitution or to approach anyone on a street for such purpose. The by-
law defines prostitution as the offering for sale or purchase of sexual 
services. Such service includes sexual activities for amusement, gratifi-
cation, pleasure, stimulation or titillation of anyone. To prevent seman-
tics in relation to the word "offering", the by-law stipulates it to 
include "the holding out, proposing, making available or expressing 
willingness to participate in" a sexual service with a person for payment. 
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The Crown claimed that "street hawking" for the purpose of prostitution is 
disorderly conduct in that it shocks the public sense of morality and is a 
public nuisance. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal was very quick to point out that supression of 
public immorality is exclusively the legislative jurisdiction of the 
Federal Government. However, public nuisance falls squarily within the 
ambit of the provinces. 
The preamble to the Calgary by-law in question states that activities by 
prostitutes "are a source of annoyance, and embarrassment" to the public 
and interfere with peaceful and free movement on public streets. The 
evidence adduced by the Crown of practices by prostitutes in plying their 
trade and prospective customers seeking those prepared to supply sexual 
services, showed that they indeed amounted to a public nuisance, which was 
defined as follows: 
• • • a public nuisance is a nuisance which is 
so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate 
in its effect that it would not be reasonable to 
expect one person to take proceedings on his own 
responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it 
should be taken as the responsibility of the 
community at large". 
An additional ingredient, which had also been met by the Crown during the 
trial of Ms. Westendorp, was to show that a representative cross section of 
the public or a class of persons, has been injuriously affected. 
The Court hastened to add that proof of such public nuisance need not be 
adduced for every trial under the by-law, but was only necessary in this 
test case to prove validity of the by-law. 
Since "public nuisance" is within the legislative jurisdiction of the 
provinces, the enabling legislation (Alberta's Municipal Government Act) 
was therefore valid and hence the Calgary by-law was intra vires that 
City's Council. "The wisdom or expediency or likely success" of the by-law 
is simply not any of the business of the judiciary, reiterated the Court of 
Appeal. 
Having dealt with the aspect of validity, the Court had to decide if the 
by-law conflicts with the Federal law respecting prostitution to suppress 
public immorality. After all, if the Federal Government had wanted to 
prohibit the practices the by-law embraces, it could have done so. Some-
times it is very vague whether the provinces or the central government have 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, if the Federal Government creates law it is 
constitutionally entitled to enact and a province (also within its legisla-
tive jurisdiction) makes law that conflicts with it, then the "paramountcy 
doctrine" dictates that the Federal law prevails. 
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However, if provincial and federal law deal with the same matter, that does 
not mean that they are in legislative conflict with one another. Gambling, 
for instance, is a good example. By-laws dealing with "machines" and ages 
of players , etc. have been tested on the same grounds. On the surf ace , 
they seem to be covering grounds similar to the provisions of the Criminal 
Code. Another example is the provincial classification of ioovies (called 
censoring by many) and the Federal prohibition to publish obscene 
material. The Courts have held that these provisions can co-exis t as they 
are provided for different purposes. The Federal Government can create 
criminal law for "peace order and good government", in matters such as 
these to deal with the evil aspects of it. The constitution (s. 92 of the 
B.N.A. Act) may well, for regulatory purposes, or to prevent public 
nuisances, give the provinces jurisdiction to legislate in the same area. 
The conflict then arises if both levels of government legislate in the same 
area for the same purpose, and the test to determine the validity of each 
is not "the similarity between the federal and provincial enactments but 
whether the provincial enactment is about a matter falling within the scope 
of s. 92" (B.N.A. Act). 
Regulating traffic on its streets and preventing public nuisances is about 
such matters, held the Court of Appeal. 
The defence had also submitted that the by-law was no more than "a colour-
able attempt to invade the area of criminal law". Although Calgary council 
had added an eloquent preamble to their by-law to pretend innocence to so 
invade, it is public knowledge that our largest Canadian centres are 
unhappy about the inability to deal with prostitution on the public streets 
due to inadequate provisions in the Criminal Code. It seems fair to say 
that the defence implied that the preamble and the other parts of the 
by-law which indicate an intent to remain within council's purview, are no 
more than camouflage. It was a colourable attempt to deal with the evil of 
prostitution and not a public nuisance. The Court agreed that it had to go 
to "the heart of the matter" to discover the "pith and substance" of the 
by-law. Colourable legislation smacks of dishonesty as the legislators, by 
analogy, come onto the property of a neighbour feigning a lawful purpose to 
do so, while in fact their intent is to trespass. 
The Court of Appeal however concluded respecting tbe intent of the by-law: 
"~n my view, it is about a nuisance on public 
streets in the City of Calgary, a matter of 
merely local nature and therefore a fit subject 
for legislation by a province". 
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Furthermore the Court held that: 
" ••• the by-law does not strike at prostitution 
as such; it does not seek to suppress the market 
for sexual favors; it seeks only to protect the 
citizens who use the streets from the invitation 
and embarrassment of being unwilling participants 
in the market". 
Soliciting for the purpose of prostitution is a criminal offence, while the 
by-law creates the offence of accosting members of the public to carry on 
the business of prostitution. Considering the definition of each the 
objectives of the enactments are distinct though they overlap in the 
practice they prohibit. 
The Court held that there was no difference in this kind of overlap and 
that of dangerous driving under the Criminal Code and careless driving in 
the provincial iootor vehicle statutes. 
Quoting from a judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada,* the Court of 
Appeal agreed that where the Parliament of Canada has not exercised some 
incidental power, that does not sterilize the provinces from doing so, as 
long as it is within their legislative competence. However, the provincial 
or the legislation by a municipality may only complement and not collide 
with federal law. 
In this case, the Calgary by-law only overlapped with the Criminal Code 
provisions but does not collide with it. 
Furthermore, when Parliament repealed the law that created an offence for a 
prostitute to be in a public place without being able to give an account of 
herself (vagrancy) it decided that such activity as "street hawking" is no 
longer a crime. If that section (l 75(l)(c)) would still have been effec-
tive, then it could have been said that the Calgary by-law was in conflict 
and collided with the criminal law. 
Said the Court of Appeal, "In conclusion the by-law is authorized by 
provincial legislation", which is valid and operable. 
Ms. Westendorp's acquittal was set 
aside and a conviction substituted. 
* * * * * 
* Dupond v. The City of Montreal (1978) 19 N.R. 478 
.. 
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POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DANGEROUS m DIE PUBLIC PEACE 
SELF PKOTECl'ION 
Regina v. Smith The County Court of Vancouver Island 
December 3, 1981 (As Yet Unreported) 
In 1978, a man was found to be in possession of a sheath knife in a 
Vancouver beer parlor. He explained that the knife was carried for self 
defence but found himself charged with possession of a weapon dangerous to 
the public peace. The County Court of Vancouver held that there was no 
evidence that the man would have used the knife "for a purpose other than 
provided in the self defence sections of the Criminal Code". The charge 
was dismissed. 
In this case Mr. Smith had in his possession a starting pistol "which is a 
fair imitation of a .38 calibre revolver". He also explained that he 
carried this object in the event of trouble to "scare people off". In 
addition the accused carried an R.C.M.P. badge which he said he would use 
to prevent being beaten up. When the accused found himself charged with 
possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, he drew the Court's 
attention to the case involving the sheath knife claiming that there was no 
difference between that case and his situation. 
The Judge of County Court of Vancouver Island expressed respect for his 
brother Judge who decided in the 1978 case, but obviously disagreed with 
him. Carrying the imitation revolver was for "a purpose calculated to give 
rise, in a threatening situation, where violence is pending or imminent, to 
an escalation or exacerbation of that violence • " 
Mr. Smith was convicted 
* * * * * 
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OBTAIJIDJG A U-DllVE CAR. BY A FALSE PUTDCK 
Regina v. Gravelle The County Court of Vancouver Island June 1981 No. CR114 
Port Alberni (As Yet Unreported) 
The accused applied for a U-drive vehicle and although he gave his proper 
name and driver's licence particulars, he lied about his address and his 
place of employment. The car was to be back at 10:00 a.m. the following 
morning, but the accused drove to Calgary where he was apprehended nearly 
two weeks later. The U-dri ve company billed the accused for the time he 
had the car and that obligation was satisfied. 
The Crown alleged that the accused obtained the car by means of a contract 
obtained by false pretences, the misrepresentations being his address and 
place of employment. If one does not return a U-drive car in accordance 
with the contract arrangement, it will not mean that one commits the crime 
of obtaining the car by a false pretence. Therefore, it was important to 
view the failure to return the car together with the misrepresentations to 
determine if the accused had the prerequisite knowledge and criminal 
intent. In addition, it was important to find that the car was let to the 
accused as a result of a reliance on the accuracy of the information the 
accused gave to the company. 
There was no doubt that the information the accused supplied was false and 
that he had knowledge of that. Neither did the Court have any doubt that 
the accused intended to keep the car for an extended period of time, how-
ever, there was no evidence of any kind that the accused intended to gain 
or did gain property interest in the car. 
The offence section (s. 405 C.C.) creates an offence for obtaining (by 
means of a false pretence) anything capable of being stolen. The predeces-
sor to this section was differently worded and it was then requisite that 
the Crown did prove possession as well as the gaining of some interest in 
the property obtained. 
This, the Court held, is considering the wording of the current definitions 
of theft and false pretences, no longer the case. 
The accused was found guilty 
* * * * * 
,. 
.. 
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DlllJRICEDESS 
Regina v. Robertson, County Court of Vancouver Island Nanaimo No. Cr. 2528 
October 1981 (As Yet Unreported) 
A store was broken into and an Indian mask was stolen. A few hours later 
the accused was picked up by police from his home and taken to the police 
station. There he saw a constable he was quite friendly with, and putting 
his arm around the cons table's shoulder the accused asked, "to talk to his 
buddy". 
The cons table told the accused, "You better tell me where the mask is, 
you've been seen running from the store". This was in fact not true. The 
accused then took the Police to a spot next to his house and produced the 
face mask. No evidence was adduced that he confessed to police, but he had 
apologized to the store owner for breaking in. There was no further 
evidence to prove that the accused broke into the store. The charges 
against the accused were break-enter and theft and possession of stolen 
property. The Crown relied on the doctrine of recent possession to prove 
that he broke into the store. 
In regards to the accused's sobriety, the officers testified that although 
they had no difficulty conversing with the accused, he was intoxicated when 
picked up and while at the police station. The accused testified that he 
is an alcoholic and could not remember breaking into the store. 
Defence counsel drew the Court's attention to a case that seemed similar in 
circumstances and which was decided by the B. C. Court of Appeal in 1975*. 
The accused in that case was convicted of being in a dwelling house w1 th 
the intent to commit an indictable offence therein. They, while in the 
home, had helped themselves to food, and their dinner was interrupted by 
police who testified that the accused were clearly drunk. The B. c. Court 
of Appeal held that in view of their intoxication the accused had been 
unable to form the specific intent to commit an indictable offence. 
The County Court Judge held that this case was distinct from this Robertson 
case. However, even if he was satisfied that it was the accused who had 
broken into the store, he would hold that he was too drunk to form the 
specific intent to commit the theft. 
* R. v. Johnnie and Namox Volume 30 of Criminal Reports (new series) Page 
202 
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In regards to the possession charge, the Crown had only proved that the 
accused had knowledge of the location of the mask. In respect to the 
doctrine of recent possession, the Court held that in spite of the fact 
that the accused had not given an explanation, possession could not be 
found. He had simply said that he could not recall due to drunkenness. 
Accused acquitted 
* * * * * 
.. 
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SERVING .. A TKDE COPY"" o:r A CEH.nFICATE 
Regina v. MacKenzie, County Court of Yale, B. c., December 1981 
No. 51/81 Penticton Registry - (As Yet Unreported) 
At the conclusion of the breath tests the certificate of analyses was 
prepared and photocopied. Then the technician signed the original and the 
copy which was subsequently served on the accused. 
Section 237(5) C.C. provides that such a certificate is not evidence unless 
a copy has been served on the accused. There are numerous cases to show 
that such a copy must be a "true copy". In this case of course, there was 
an argument to say that what was served on the accused was, because of the 
signature being added after the copying, not a true copy of the original 
certificate. 
The Provincial Court Judge disagreed with the accused and convicted him of 
a charge of "over .08%". 
The accused appealed unsuccessfully to the County Court advancing the same 
argument respecting the certificate. The Court was not necessarily 
enthusiastic about the practice followed by the technician and considered 
the trial judge's comment that there "was not one shred of evidence to 
indicate that the original was not the same" as the document served on the 
accused, an over statement. However, the County Court Judge held that 
there was evidence which allowed the trial judge to conclude that the docu-
ment served on the accused was sufficient a copy of the original certifi-
cate to be within the meaning of "copy" as used in section 237 C.C. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
* * * * * 
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EVIDENCE OF IHPAIKMEBT 
Regina v. Langlois, County Court of Yale, B. C., December 1981 
No. 205/81 Penticton Registry - (As Yet Unreported) 
A police officer observed the accused in a store. He showed symptoms of 
impairment such as: "smell of liquor, unsteady stance, eyes watery and 
bloodshot". The accused was, when he drove away from the store, immedi-
ately stopped and additional symptoms such as difficulty to extract licence 
from the wallet and slurred speech were noted. The accused's breath was 
analyzed and a reading of .26 and .24 resulted. Due to the certificate 
filed in evidence (being the replacement of an earlier one) an argument 
ensued at trial if there was any evidence of the accused's bli>od alcohol 
level at the time. As the accused was charged with impaired driving and 
"over .08%", the trial judge held that since there was sufficient evidence 
to convict the accused of impaired driving without evidence of blood 
alcohol content, the question of whether the certificate had any evidenti-
ary value was academic. He convicted the accused accordingly. 
The conviction was appealed and the accused argued that for the following 
reasons there was insufficient evidence to convict him of impaired driving: 
1. There were no sobriety tests conducted; 
2. The Crown did not establish that the constable had sufficient experi-
ence to be considered an expert on degrees of impairment; 
3. There was no evidence relating the symptoms of impairment to the intake 
of alcohol; and 
4. There was no evidence of erratic driving. 
This County Court Judge did not consider all of the above, points for 
validity. However, he held that a binding ruling by the B. C. Supreme 
Court established the proposition that: 
(\ 
". • • evidence of a blood alcohol content 
over .08% is circumstantial evidence that 
alcohol was ingested before the test, it 
cannot be evidence of impairment in the 
absence of expert opinion evidence as to 
what effect such a reading would have on 
the subject's ability to drive".* 
* Re Quiring 6 Criminal Reports (3rd) 289 
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The Court held that without the certificate to show the excessive blood-
alcohol content, there was in this case insufficient evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused drove while his ability to do so 
was impaired by alcohol. 
As there was no evidence from an expert to interpret the readings obtained, 
it was also academic in the appeal proceedings whether the certificate was 
admissible or had any evidentiary value. If this Court held that it was 
admissible and was evidence of readings of .26 and .24% it would still not 
assist the Crown without the requisite expert evidence. 
Comment 
Accused's Appeal Allowed 
Conviction Quashed 
Please note that this Court did not hold that, without an analysis of 
breath and the interpretation of an expert, a charge of impaired driving 
cannot result in a conviction. The symptoms by themselves, and the 
investigation by the officer were simply inadequate to amount by themselves 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was 
impaired by alcohol. 
* * * * * 
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USIBG lORCB ro TAKE FIBGEHPH.IlllS 
TRESPASS TO PERSON 
B. v. Baugh and Attorney General of B. C. 2 W.W.R. [1982) 126 
British Columbia Supreme Court 
"B" is a juvenile who was arrested for a delinquency which would be an 
indictable offence if he was an adult. While in lawful custody, Cst. Baugh 
used force to obtain B's fingerprints. 
B sued Cst. Baugh and Attorney General claiming that the use of force was a 
trespass to his person. Before the trial started the following question of 
law had to be determined: 
"ls a peace officer in whose lawful custody is a 
juvenile charged with a delinquency under the 
J .D. Act which relates to an indictable offence 
under the Criminal Code authorized by the Identi-
fication of Criminals Act or by common law or 
otherwise to use reasonable force in taking the 
fingerprints of the said juvenile, where the 
juvenile does not consent to the taking of 
fingerprints?" 
Firstly the Supreme Court Judge held that the provisions of the Identifica-
tion of Criminals Act did not apply. B was charged with a delinquency and 
not an indictable offence. Therefore, there was no statutory provision 
authorizing the actions of the officer. 
There are a number of cases which seem, on the surface, similar to this one 
but are distinct in that the issue was not whether the officer was civilly 
liable for the taking of the fingerprints by force, but if the evidence of 
the prints so taken was admissible. 
In one B. C. Case* the Court of Appeal held that the taking of the finger-
prints of juveniles was illegal but that the evidence was relevant and 
probative and therefore admissible. 
Since Cst. Baugh lacked statutory authority to take the fingerprints by 
force the Court addressed itself to the question whether a common law 
authority for such action exists. Reviewing the law on this issue the 
Court concluded that no common law justifies the use of force to take 
fingerprints in spite of there being "much good sense in authorizing police 
* R. v. A.N. [1978] 3 w.w.R. 222 
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officers to use reasonable force for the purpose of taking fingerprints of 
juveniles". 
Said the Court: 
"Who can authorize the use of force in the taking 
of fingerprints? Certainly it should not be the 
courts. Parliament has already justified the use 
of force for the purpose of taking fingerprints 
from persons charged with indictable offences. 
Parliament can, if it is so advised, extend that 
authority to cases of juveniles who are in 
custody charged with having committed delinquen-
cies". 
The question of law quoted above, 
was answered in the negative. 
* * * * * 
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MURDER 
BY ACCIDDT <It MISTAKE MDRDEIUllG A PERSON amEK. 'DIAN "lBE ORE "lBE 
PERPETKA.TOR. IBTKRDED TO llLL 
R. v. Droste 63 c.c.c. (2d) 418 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused wanted to kill his wife and shared various plans to do so with 
co-workers. He told one colleague how he would put gasoline soaked rags 
under the seat of his car and when out with his wife, drive into an abut-
ment. He then would hit his wife over the head rendering her Wlconscious 
and set fire to the car. He told how he had filled a pipe with zinc to hit 
his wife with. 
An accident occurred involving the accused, his wife and two children, the 
circumstances of which were very similar to the plan the accused revealed 
to his co-worker. The accused did not manage to knock his wife tmconscious 
and both escaped from the burning car. The couple's two children in the 
back seat were not so fortunate and lost their lives in the incident. The 
accused was convicted on two counts of first degree murder: this in spite 
of his testimony that he did not intend to kill his wife and did not tell 
his co-worker of any such plan. 
The trial judge had instructed the jury that if they found that at the time 
the accused caused the death of his children, he intended to kill his wife, 
then second degree murder had been proved. In addition, if they were 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the intention to murder his wife 
was planned and deliberate, then the murder of the children was first 
degree murder. 
In other words, the trial judge combined sections 212(b) and 214(2) of the 
Criminal Code to define first degree murder. He, in essence, held that 
planned and deliberate murder does not have to be in relation to the person 
the murderer intended to kill. 
This, the accused claimed, was erroneous in law. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and said: 
"We are also of the view that the transfer-
ence of a planned and deliberate intention 
to kill one person to the actual victim is 
in accord with the general principles of 
the criminal law". 
• .. 
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What is punishable as first degree murder is the planning and the deliber-
ate killing of a lruman being even if by accident or mistake the victim is a 
person other than the one the perpetrator intended to kill. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Convictions of first degree murder 
upheld. 
Note: Leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
granted last December (1981). 
Comment 
What the Ontario Court of Appeal held seems uncomplicated. It simply said 
what makes a murder first degree murder is to kill another lruman being 
having planned and committed the murder deliberately whether or not the 
person killed was the intended victim. That, the Court held, was cons is-
tent with the principles of criminal law and that opinion seems to make a 
lot of sense. 
Defence counsel's objective apparently was to show that by virtue of 
section 222(b), that if the accused committed murder, it was second degree 
murder. After all, he planned to murder his wife and not his children. 
There seems to be a third alternative in these circumstances, if this does 
run afoul of the res judicata dictum. In the process of attempting to 
murder his wife he murdered his children. If the view has to be taken that 
the provisions of 221 (b) and 214(2) C.C. cannot be combined to find murder 
in the first degree, then perhaps a conviction of attempted murder and two 
c~unts of second degree murder should have been appropriate. 
* * * * * 
- 16 -
CONFESSIONS Ali» Al»fI.SSIOBS 
STATEMENT TAUB AFTn COURSEL DIDICATKS ACCUSED WISHES TO REKAIH SILENT 
R. v. Dinardo 61 c.c.c. (2d) 52 
County Court Ontario 
The accused's "mandatory supervision" was cancelled and he was to report to 
a Solicitor General's agency. Before he did so he dropped in at his 
lawyer's and, on account of criminal activities which caused the cancella-
tion, he was urged not to answer any questions put to him by police. One 
lawyer accompanied the accused and made it known to the agent and a police 
staff sergeant assigned to that office, that his client wished to exercise 
his right to remain silent. He left his business card mid home phone 
number and instructed that any police officer who wished to question his 
client had to call him first so he could be present. 
The staff sergeant had at one stage of the conversation said that 
he had no need to question the accused. He had known "Joe" (the accused) 
for 20 years and it would be quite futile to ask him any questions. 
The message, the lawyer's card and the specific instructions were appar-
ently not passed on and the accused was questioned in respect to an armed 
robbery after being informed by two officers of his right to remain 
silent. At his trial for allegedly being an accessory after the fact to 
the offence of robbery and possession of stolen property, counsel for the 
defense argued that the two statements the accused gave police were inad-
missible. 
He argued that, although the statements were made voluntarily, they came as 
a result of "an unjustifiable invasion of the relationship between a 
solicitor and his client and the right to retain and instruct counsel". 
In view of the specific instructions left for police, the Court did not 
"subscribe as appropriate" the conduct by police in these circumstances. 
However, disapproval of methods used by the authorities is no justification 
to exclude a voluntary confession from evidence. Interrogation is a proper 
method of investigation and the accused was quite aware of his rights. 
Statements admitted in evidence. 
* * * * * 
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APPLICATION FOK. An'ERDARCE OF BREATHALYZER. TECHRICIAR 
Regina v. Yurko County Court of Vancouver No. CC810929 February 1982 
Defence counsel, who had been "involved in the case very early in the game" 
said at the trial of the accused for charges of impaired driving and "over 
.08%" that he would apply for the attendance of the breathalyzer technician 
who had analyzed the accused's breath. The trial judge demanded to know 
"why haven't you done this earlier?" and refused to grant an adjournment to 
accommodate the accused in this regard. 
The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of "over .08%" 
and appealed the conviction. 
The Crown had relied on the certificate evidence to prove the blood 
alcohol-content and the accused argued that in fact three samples of his 
breath were taken. The second sample had been taken moments after the 
first one and the second and third analyses were recorded on the certifi-
cate. 
The only witness who could clear up this matter was the technician and he 
should have been called. 
Quoting precedents, the County Court Judge held that there is no require-
ment to apply before trial for the attendance of the technician. As a 
matter of fact the application can be made as late as when the certificate 
evidence is adduced. If there are some bases for that attendance, the 
Court has no alternative but to grant the application. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Dismissal ordered 
* * * * * 
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UNEXPLAIHED INCOLPATOK.Y CIK.CDMSTAHCES 
Sherett v. The Queen B. C. Court of Appeal 1/23/81 February 1982 
The accused and a co-worker were janitors in a company office. The accused 
cleaned the office of the president of the company and found a sealed 
envelope containing money ($2,367.57) on the desk. The accused showed the 
envelope to his partner and said it had money in it. Later on he revealed 
that it had "lots of money" in it. His partner swore he never touched the 
envelope. 
The following day the accused excused himself from coming to work and said 
he had to visit a sick relative in the interior of B. C. However, police 
found him home when they attended at his apartment. 
The accused had apparently nothing to say and no money was found on him or 
in his apartment. 
At the conclusion of his trial for "theft over $200" the trial judge 
observed that the accused had not given any explanation to the police or in 
the form of testimony. The trial judge quoted the well known words: 
• • • " there comes a time when circums tan-
tial evidence having enveloped an accused 
in a strong and cogent network of inculpa-
tory facts, the accused is bound to make 
some contradiction or explanation or stand 
condemned and face the risk of conviction." 
The trial judge was of the opinion that the absence of an explanation in 
these circumstances was sufficient to draw the inference that the accused 
had stolen the money. 
The accused appealed his conviction claiming that the trial judge had 
imposed a duty on the accused to testify while the burden of proof was on 
the Crown to prove the theft. It had been his right to remain silent and 
not to call evidence in his defence. The Crown simply did not have a case, 
claimed the accused. 
: 
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The Court did not reverse the dictum that there comes a time that an 
explanation is in order and that the lack of it may condemn an accused. 
However, the Court of Appeal did not feel this could be applied to this 
case. It found the Crown's case, "not a strong one" and there simply was 
no evidence "one would expect the appellant to contradict". 
For one thing, showing the money to his partner tends to show a lack of 
intent to steal. 
The failure of the accused to testify was not part of the Crown's proof in 
this case. 
Accused's appeal allowed; 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF -EXTRA JUDICIAL IDENTIFICArior 
VHKU WITNESS IS UHABLE TO IDENTIFY ACCUSED DUR.IRG TRIAL 
Regina v. Swanton B. C. Court of Appeal C.A.810605 February 1982 
(As Yet Unreported) 
A doctor advertised his car and a bearded man came to view it. This person 
returned with another man (believed to be prospective purchasers) and were 
invited into the doctor's home. Instead of selling his car the doctor was 
tied up, gagged and robbed. Shortly after the doctor identified the 
bearded man in a line-up and again during a preliminary hearing respecting 
a charge of robbery. 
During the trial, 1 1/2 years later, the doctor said (when invited to 
identify the clean shaven accused as one of the men who robbed him) "I see 
someone that resembles him. But • • • ". 
To remedy the matter of "no identification" the Crown suggested to compli-
ment the doctor's testimony of previous identifications, with police 
evidence that the person identified in the line-up and at the preliminary 
inquiry and the accused at trial, were one and the same person. 
Following a precedent* which establishes that "if at trial, the person does 
not identify the accused, evidence that he did identify him on an earlier 
occasion cannot be admitted", the trial judge acquitted the accused and the 
Crown appealed. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal decided to "reconsider the correctness" of that 
law and concluded that: 
"evidence of extra-judicial identification 
is admissible not only to corroborate an 
identification made at trial but as 
independent evidence going to identity". 
The Court of Appeal agreed with another judicial decision which esta-
blished: 
"The failure of the witness to repeat the 
extra judicial identification in court does 
not destroy its probative value, for such 
failure may be explained by loss of memory 
or other circumstances". 
Crown's appeal allowed; 
New trial ordered 
* * * * * 
* R. v. McGuire (1975) 29 C.R.N.S. 282 
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DD'EClIVE BUATHALYZElt CAUSING IELAY - 'l'WO ll>UJl TIME PERIOD 
CORTDWIBG DEMAIID - UASOHABLE EXCUSE TO REFUSE 
Regina v. Lavery County Court of Prince Rupert (No. 2937-Z Smithers) 
(Unreported) 
The accused was stopped by Cst. G. at 10:30 p.m., arrested for impaired 
driving and demanded to supply a sample of his breath. A breathalyzer was 
available approximately 3 miles away. However, due to it malfunctioning 
the accused was turned over to Cst. P. and taken to a location "some 
distance" away which took one hour to cover. Upon arrival there at 11 :40 
p.m., another client was being processed and the accused was asked to 
wait. By now it was midnight. At this time the accused called his lawyer 
and he and the constable had a conversation with him. The actual call took 
1 minutes but it was not clear how long it had taken to place the call. 
After this the accused refused to give a breath sample and was convicted 
accordingly in Provincial Court. 
Appealing the conviction the accused firstly argued that the Crown had not 
proved that his refusal came within the two hour time period. He claimed 
that when he failed to supply the sample the 2 hour period had elapsed. At 
least it was doubtful that it had not and he should have the benefit of 
that doubt. Apparently Crown evidence did not include the actual time of 
refusal and the matter hinged on time calculations. The County Court Judge 
(upon close examination of the transcript) was not prepared to agree with 
the defence argument and supported the trial judge's finding that the 
refusal was within the 2 hour limit. 
Then the accused argued that there had only been one demand made of him and 
that was by Cst. G. and he had not refused to comply with that one. He had 
refused to give Cst. P. a breath sample and he had not made any demand of 
him. In other words, the accused challenged if, in the circumstances, a 
demand is continuing. 
The evidence revealed that after his telephone conversation, Cst. P. had 
said to the accused: "Are you going to provide breath samples or not?" The 
accused had replied: "No, I refuse". This, the trial judge had found to be 
a renewal of the demand Cst. G. made of the accused. He could, upon the 
reasonable and probable grounds he had as a result of information he 
received from Cst. G., have made a fresh demand. However, nothing occurred 
to disrupt the demand made by Cst. G.; it had continued and was renewed by 
Cst. P. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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Comment 
It is incorrect to deduce from these reasons for judgment that 
continue and that renewal will keep them current for the two 
after driving. When a demand is refused, the offence of 
complete. When the refusal is ignored by the peace officer(s), 
be that the demand expires. 
all demands 
hour period 
refusal is 
it may well 
The defence in this case has brought the well known Kosteniuk* case to the 
attention of the Court. Kosteniuk (charged with refusing to give samples 
of breath) had refused at the scene, and at the police station. As both 
refusals were ignored, Kosteniuk demanded to phone his lawyer. He was 
denied an opportunity to do so and a third demand was made with similar 
results. The Crown had argued that the offence of refusal was complete 
long before Kosteniuk was denied to retain and instruct counsel~ In other 
words, it was conceded that the accused had a reasonable excuse to refuse 
the last demand but not either one of the first two. In that case the 
County Court had held that the refusal to be considered for a prosecution 
is the last refusal. 
For Lavery, there had only been one demand which was renewed and there was 
only one refusal. 
* * * * * 
* 1981 issue of B. C. Decisions, number 5645-04 
·. 
. 
. . 
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BICHROMATE AND DICHROMATE 
BKEATBALYZU. 
Regina v. Taylor County Court of Prince Rupert No. C.C. 59/81 
(Unreported) 
The accused appealed his conviction on a charge of "over .08%". The Crown 
had called the breathalyzer technician who had identified the content of 
the ampoule used to analyze the accused's breath, as potassium bichromate. 
One of the certificates, either that of the technician or analyst, had 
called the same substance "potassium dichromate". 
Although it was conceded in previous cases on this point that there is no 
difference between potassium dichromate and potassium bichromate, the Court 
could not accept that without expert evidence substantiating it. 
The differece in the description of the substance used for the analyses 
left the Court with a reasonable doubt in respect to the identification of 
the ampoule. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction set aside. 
* * * * * 
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SERVICE TO A PRISONER. OF BEASONABLE l«JTICK 'l'BAT 'DIE "lECllNICIAR'S 
CERTIFICATE WILL BE ADDUCED IN EVIDENCE TO PROVE BLOOD-ALCOHOL LEVEL 
R. v. Braulin County Court of Vancouver Island Victoria No. 19121 November 
1981 (As Yet Unreported) 
The accused appealed his conviction of "over .08%", claiming that he had 
not been given reasonable notice of the Crown's intention to introduce the 
technician's certificate in evidence to prove his blood-alcohol content at 
the time of driving. 
The technician had served a copy of the certificate on the accused right 
after the analysis and had explained its content and intent. Then the 
accused was booked in cells and all his property, including the certifi-
cate, was taken from him. It is assumed that when he received his property 
back this included the certificate but there was no evidence to show this. 
The County Court Judge's ruling in response to the accused's submission was 
simple 
"To give a copy of a certificate to the accused 
and then take it away is not to give it to the 
accused". 
He said the giving of the copy to the accused must not be assumed and 
concluded that, therefore, no technical service of the copy on the accused 
was proved. 
New trial ordered 
* * * * * 
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REASONABLE EXCUSE TO UFOSE TO GIVE SAMPLES OF llEATll 
R. v. Ryan County Court of Vancouver No. CC810444 January 29, 1982 
(As Yet Unreported) 
The accused rolled his car and he and his passenger were just crawling out 
of the windows when police arrived. There were no apparent injuries and a 
demand for samples of breath was made. The accused responded by saying 
that he wanted to see a doctor. After 20 minutes of questioning and tests 
the accused said: "I have enough of this" and attempted to leave. He had, 
just previously to this, told the officer that he was feeling sick. 
The accused was restrained, handcuffed and brought back into the interview 
room. The accused then demanded to phone a lawyer. The officer supplied a 
phone, removed the handcuffs and left the accused alone so he could speak 
privately with his lawyer although he could be observed. 
The accused got the answering service when he dialed the lawyer's office 
and the operator told him to "hang on". This came after several tries to 
make contact and periods of waiting. According to the accused, one of the 
officers took the phone away, told the person at the answering service who 
he was and that he was holding the accused for impaired driving, and then 
hung up. This was denied by police. Their version was that the accused 
terminated the call himself and accompanied police to the breathalyzer. No 
further mention of contacting a lawyer was made. The trial judge did not 
say who he believed, but convicted the accused of failing to provide breath 
samples. 
The accused appealed the conviction and claimed that the denial of medical 
treatment (a mild concussion was diagnosed subsequently) and failure of 
police to provide an opportunity to consult counsel gave the accused a 
reasonable excuse to refuse giving samples of his breath. Furthermore, it 
must be presumed that the trial judge had accepted the police version of 
the circumstances surrounding the telephone call. Thus, he held that the 
accused's requests had been complied w1 th and that no further requests to 
consult counsel were made. This, the accused claims, was an unreasonable 
conclusion considering the evidence. The County Court Judge, however, held 
that the finding was not unreasonable. 
Four subsequent demands were made of the accused and each was refused for 
reasons other than firstly consulting a lawyer. He refused because he 
wanted to have his "brains x rayed", or he wanted to learn how his passen-
ger was doing and "I don't like the way you are handling things". 
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After police realized that any further attempts to obtain breath tests 
would be fruitless, they took the accused to a doctor. The doctor found 
that the accused had no neurological deficit and that he showed no symptoms 
of loss of memory or confusion. In other words the accused's refusal was a 
conscious act. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
* * * * * 
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ADMISSIBILITY ARD WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OF A LICENCE llJMBEll 
READ OUT TO A DIIRD PARTY BY A PERSON WHO CARNOT AT. TKIAL, 
VOUCH FOil ACCUKACY OF BOMBERS 
Regina v. McRae County Court of Vancouver - No. C.C.820023 April 1982 
(As Yet Unreported) 
At 2:00 a.m. a tenant saw a man expose himself at her window. The landlord 
was alerted and observed a man running to and then drive away in a pick-up 
truck. The landlord called the licence number out to his wife who noted it 
down at the time. The recorded licence number was given to police who, 
shortly after, stopped the accused in a pick-up truck bearing that licence 
number. u 
The tenant could not identify the accused. The landlord could not remember 
the numbers he called out to his wife, vouch that whatever he called out to 
her was accurately recorded, or how information of the licence number was 
passed to police. All he could testify to was that the numbers he called 
out were those on the licence plate of the departing pick-up truck. His 
wife did not testify, nor was her note produced in evidence. 
In spite of the accused's arguments that the licence number evidence was 
hearsay and that no witness could be cross-examined as to the accuracy of 
the information passed to police which lead to the arrest, he was convicted 
of trespass by night. The accused appealed the conviction. 
The County Court Judge held that the licence number evidence was hearsay i:;-
and inadmissible to prove the truth of its content. 
In this case, the evidence would have been admissible had the landlord's 
wife testified that she had accurately recorded what was called out to her 
and if her notation was checked and affirmed by "the actual witness" (the 
landlord) at the time or shortly after it was ma.de. 
As there was a good deal of other evidence which well may support a verdict 
of guilty, a new trial was ordered instead of quasaing the conviction. 
* * * * * 
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THE HEANIHG OF 00COBSUllED00 
Bushchlen and The Queen B. C. Court of Appeal C.A. 811174 April 30, 1982 
(As Yet Unreported) 
The accused had consumed an alcoholic beverage which, according to a letter 
from a university pharmacology professor, ought to have produced 45 milli-
grams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of his (the accused's) blood. Yet when 
breath tests were taken by a breathalyzer technician, the analyses resulted 
in readings of 210 and 200 milligrams respectively. 
The accused was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while having consumed 
alcohol in such quantity that the proportion thereof exceeded 80 milligrams 
of alcohol in 100 milligrams of blood. He appealed this conviction. 
The accused did not question the accuracy of the analyses, but argued that 
the alcohol in excess of the 45 milligrams, was not due to consumption of 
alcohol, but rather from inadvertent inhalation of alcoholic vapours. He 
had worked for several hours prior to being apprehended with a spray 60% of 
which was alcohol. 
The Court of Appeal, for technical reasons, could only deal with the ques-
tion of fact if the evidence of the inadvertent inhalation raised a reason-
able doubt. The court found that with 175 and 165 milligrams over the 
legal limit by means of such inadvertance, leaves no room for reasonable 
doubt. Said the Court of Appeal: 
"Clearly this is not a marginal case where the theory 
of the defence might give rise to a reasonable 
doubt". 
Therefore, it was and had been found as a fact that the accused had con-
sumed alcohol that caused his blood-alcohol content to exceed the legal 
limit. 
The accused's leave to appeal was 
refused. 
His conviction was upheld. 
Note: The defence theory the accused raised in this Court of Appeal was on 
a question of law, to which he was not entitled. He had previously 
appealed his conviction unsuccessfully to a B. C. County Court. The 
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findings of facts in the trial court and the County Court did simply not 
support the question of law the accused raised in the Court of Appeal. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal did, however, consider the defence unique and 
was prepared to "assume" what the word "consumed" means in s. 236 of the 
Criminal Code. The court held that in spite of the fact that this was not 
the case to determine that question: 
". • • the use of the word consumed in section 236 
is confined to the drinking of alcoholic bever-
ages in the conventional sense and does not 
extend to the inadvertent inhalation of alcoholic 
fumes. However, if such fumes are deliberately 
inhaled to produce intoxication, that might well 
be regarded as falling within this use of the 
word "consumed", as it would have the element of 
mens rea. I am prepared as well to assume, in 
this context of the use of the word "consump-
tion", that it would include the eating of food 
which has fermented into alcohol or has been 
cooked in or flavoured with alcoholic beverages, 
but not the mere savouring of its redolence " . 
* * * * * 
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AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE 
Regina v. Hay , County Court of Vancouver Island No. 22603 Victoria 
January 1982 (As Yet Unreported) 
The officer made a demand for a sample of breath from the accused at a 
location where he was 7 minutes from one breathalyzer instrument and 20 
minutes from another. He decided to take the accused to the latter loca-
tion. The accused appealed his conviction of "over .08%" claiming that the 
evidence of the analyses was not admissible as the samples were not taken 
as soon as practicable. 
The Court held that it was the constable's perogative where to analyze the 
breath of the accused. However, if the Court concludes that the detour 
caused the samples not having been taken reasonably prompt, the evidence of 
the analyses may not be admissible. 
In this case, the detour caused a delay of 13 minutes. In view that the 
law calls for the sample to be taken as soon as practicable and not as soon 
as possible, the delay in this case was not significant. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
* * * * * 
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LEGAL EXECUTION OF DUTY 
OBSTRDC'l'ION OF A PEACE OFFICER 
The Queen v. Mather County Court of Kootenay 
Rossland CC106/81 February 16/82 
In the late evening a police officer on patrol spotted a car parked on the 
highway without any lights on and another vehicle in front of it but parked 
on the side of the road. When the officer pulled up behind the car on the 
roadway the accused got out and ran to the car in front and sat in its back 
seat. Upon the request of the officer the accused stepped out of the car 
and when asked for identification she used foul and obscene language to 
tell the officer to depart and stop the interview. After being told she 
would be arrested if she failed to comply with the demand for identifica-
tion, she would be arrested, the accused went as far as saying her first 
name but declined to give any other details. The officer "then arrested 
her and placed her in the back of the police car". 
At trial, the constable said that he was of the opinion that the accused 
was impaired but none of his options under the Criminal Code in respect to 
drinking drivers were exercised. With the exception of "obstruction" 
because she refused to give her name, no charges were laid and it was held 
that the officer did not find the accused committing any offence. 
Although her behaviour was "reprehensible" the trial court acquitted the 
accused. She was not found committing any offence and she was under no 
obligation to identify herself. The Crown appealed the acquittal. 
The County Court Judge held that the police officer was engaged in the 
execution of his duty, however, in this case the obstruction was not 
"wilful!" in that it was done with lawful excuse. Wilfull does not only 
connote "intentional" but also "something done without lawful excuse". 
The Court concluded: 
Comment 
"On the authorities, therefore, while the 
conduct of the respondent is to be viewed 
with disgust and revulsion, I am unable to 
come to the conclusion that her obstruction 
was without lawful excuse". 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
The now famous Moore* case seems on the surface somewhat similar to this 
* 1978) 43 c.c.c. (2d) 83 
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case. Moore also failed to identify himself, and the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that this had amounted to wilful! obstruct~on. However, there 
is quite a distinction between the circumstances in Moore and this case. 
Moore went with his bicycle across an intersection against a red traffic 
light. When stopped he refused to identify himself and if allowed to do 
so, would have stiff led the summary conviction procedure as without his 
name it was difficult to proceed against him. 
Furthermore, 
officers an 
them. 
the Moore case is, in rey view, inclined to give police 
inf lated view of the authority the precedent actually gives 
The Supreme Court of Canada zeroed in on the actual and restricted issue. 
Said the Justice giving the majority judgme~t: 
"I am confining my consideration of this 
matter to the actual circumstances which 
occurred, that is, that a constable on duty 
observed the appellant in the act of 
committing an infraction of the Statute and 
that that constable had no power to arrest 
the accused for such an offence unless and 
until he had attempted to identify the 
accused so that he might be the subject of 
summary conviction proceedings." 
Both the B. C. Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada referred to 
the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada in relation to the powers of 
arrest and public interest. Some are of the opinion that the decision 
authorizes police to arrest a person when found committing any summary 
conviction offence, including those under Provincial statutes. This 
opinion seems mainly to find its source in the Supreme Court of Canada 
quoting section 101 of the B. C. Summary Convictions Act (now called 
Offence Act) which provides that the Criminal Code applies mutatis 
mutandis, where it (the B. C. Summary Convictions Act) has not made express 
provisions: it should be remembered that in relation to the powers of 
arrest the B. C. Summary Convictions Act does not make any provision, but 
the individual Provincial statutes do. The Supreme Court alluded only to 
the definition of public interest, which includes establishing the identity 
of the accused and concluded that in these circumstances, where the power 
of arrest was not provided for, that it would be justified to arrest upon 
"finding committing" only to establish the accused's identity. 
I do not believe it can be read in these reasons for judgement that the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the provision of the Criminal Code 
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(section 450) authorizes arrests for Provincial Summary Conviction 
offences, especially not where the Provincial Statute expressly provides 
for and restricts such authority for certain offences only. It must be 
remembered what the issue was in the Moore case. The police officer found 
the accused committing a Provincial summary conviction offence which was 
not included in those for which a police officer may arrest without 
warrant. When the accused refused to identify himself, the officer 
arrested the accused not for the offence he found him committing, but for 
obstructing him in the lawful performance of his duty, which is an 
indictable offence under the Criminal Code of Canada. The Supreme Court 
held that it was the officer's duty to determine the accused's identity as 
otherwise the process against him could not commence. The Court seemed 
only persuaded by and found comfort in the fact that Parliament considered 
the identity of a person part of the public interest (section 450(2) 
C.C.). The Supreme Court held that the officer's actions and the arrest he 
effected for obstruction were proper and nothing 100re. 
* * * * * 
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TIDBIT 
The accused appealed his conviction of refusing to give a sample of his 
breath on the basis that the trial judge had admitted the words he spoke in 
refusing without holding a voir dire to determine the admissibility of them 
in evidence. The Saskatchewan Queen's Bench Justice held that holding a 
voir dire was quite unnecessary as the words spoken constituted the very 
offencealleged against him. In other words, the entire trial was to 
determine the admissibility, the evidentiary value and the meaning of those 
words. 
([1982] 2 W.W.R. 514 Friesen v. R.) 
